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1 Introduction 
Forestry plays a key role in climate change mitigation and decreasing the amount of carbon dioxide 
(CO2) in the atmosphere (IPCC  2019). The most efficient way to manage carbon emissions is to set 
a price for units of carbon through taxation or purchasable permits through an emissions trading 
scheme (Baumol 1972, Hagmann et al. 2019). A way for polluters to compensate for their emissions 
is to introduce forest carbon offsets into the trading scheme, as seen in California and New Zealand 
(Nurmi and Ollikainen 2019). In both programs, the price of carbon is represented through carbon 
subsidies and taxes that enter the forest owner’s optimization problem (see e.g. Van Kooten et al. 
1995). 
 
Currently, carbon pricing mechanisms applied and initiatives under consideration cover a total of 
20,1% of global greenhouse gas emissions (World bank 2019). The regulation on Land Use, Land 
Use Change and Forestry -sector (LULUCF) by European Union in 2018 sets the accounting methods 
of CO2 sinks and emissions of the member states (EU 2018/841). The regulation states that the 
LULUCF-sector of a member state should not be a source of carbon emissions, which brings up the 
question of the optimal forestry and land-use management practices when carbon sequestration has a 
value. As the economic viability of storing carbon in a forest depends on its growth, end-products, 
and non-timber ecosystem services provided, the question of where to increase the carbon storage is 
not trivial.  
 
Hartman (1976) extended the classic stand-level model by Faustmann (1849) with non-timber 
amenity values, leading the way for natural resource economists to value forestland in various ways 
other than sole timber production. Where Hartman considered the external services as a function of 
the stand age, the model in Van Kooten et. al. (1995) presents the utility of storing carbon in the 
model as function of the change in stand biomass. The study, among various other economic papers 
on single-stand optimization problem with carbon pricing (e.g. Hoen and Soldberg 1997, Gong and 
Kriström 1999, Caparrós 2003), consider the carbon price as a subsidy-based instrument. Recall that 
when carbon storages are a commodity with a market price, the forest owner’s problem is to maximize 
the net profits from timber production and carbon subsidies.  
 
Under all stand-level analyses with an exogenous timber price lies the axiom of a normal forest, i.e. 
the timber flow is even over time. This assumption was challenged by Mitra-Wan tree farm model 
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(Mitra and Wan 1985), which presented a market-level economic problem where, with endogenous 
timber price and discounting, an optimal harvest leads to a cyclical solution instead of a steady state. 
Later, Salo and Tahvonen (2002) proved analytically that the cycles occur due to a discrete time 
model. In Salo and Tahvonen (2004), it is shown that in the presence of alternative land-use in the 
optimal solution, the cycles vanish and the age-class allocation converges towards a normal forest. 
Carbon sequestration is introduced into the model by Cunha-e-Sá et al. (2006, 2013), Akao (2011), 
and Tahvonen and Rautiainen (2017). In Tahvonen and Rautiainen (2017), they prove the existence 
of optimal solution where a part of the forestland is allocated purely for carbon storage purposes, i.e. 
a high enough carbon price leads to forest conservation. 
 
Currently, the existing carbon pricing schemes worldwide vary in their pricing mechanisms and the 
accounting methods. In economic literature, an optimal price for carbon is characterized as a marginal 
social cost of carbon, i.e. the amount of economic loss from releasing one unit of carbon into the 
atmosphere (Cai et al. 2015, Nordhaus 2017). Nordhaus (2017) estimates that the global social cost 
of carbon in 2050 with the current policies would be $50 - $250 per ton of CO2 in 2010 US dollars, 
depending on the interest rate. Cai et al. (2015) use a model with a climate tipping point and estimate 
the social cost of carbon to be $316 - $814 per ton in 2100.  
 
Although the variability and uncertainty with future cost estimations are high, there is a consensus 
among climate economists that the current carbon prices have to increase substantially in the 
upcoming decades (Nurmi and Ollikainen 2019). Stand-level studies have shown that an increase in 
carbon price may lengthen the optimal rotation period, increase annual timber output and ultimately 
lead to forest conservation (see e.g. Olscheswski and Benítez 2010, Akao 2011, Assmuth et al. 2018). 
Market-level studies based on the Mitra-Wan tree farm model find that an increase in the carbon price 
will lengthen the optimal rotation period, lead to afforestation and thus increase the agricultural land 
rent (Cunha-e-Sá et al. 2013, Tahvonen and Rautiainen 2017.)  None of the studies based on the 
Mitra-Wan tree farm model include multiple land classes and carbon subsidies simultaneously. This 
would allow the study of the unilateral carbon sequestration program’s effects in areas outside the 
program, i.e. Carbon leakage. 
 
Existing market-level studies on carbon leakage are performed through theoretical analyses, 
econometric studies and general and partial equilibrium modeling (see e.g. Sohngen et al. 1999, 
Murray et al. 2004, Nepal et al. 2013, Harstad and Mideksa 2017). Murray et al. (2004) provide a 
general equilibrium model to show that the carbon leakage in U.S. may range from 10% to 90%, 
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depending on the sequestration activity and region. Similarly, Gan and McCarl (2007) estimate that, 
on a global scale, 42% - 95% of the positive environmental gains are offset elsewhere. Both studies 
conclude that the magnitude of carbon leakage depends on the demand elasticity. In addition, all these 
studies assume that carbon sequestration programs decrease the timber supply, which will be satisfied 
by increasing harvests elsewhere, leading to carbon leakage. The assumption fails to consider a) the 
stand-level studies showing that carbon subsidies may increase the long run timber supply (e.g. 
Assmuth et al. 2018) and b) that an increase in profitability due to carbon subsidies may lead to 
afforestation in commercial forestry (Cunha-e-Sá et al. 2013, García et al. 2018). 
 
This thesis aims to challenge the above-mentioned assumptions of forest-sector carbon leakage. In 
chapter two, we present both analytical and numerical results for the van Kooten et al. (1995) stand-
level model with poor and fertile forest stands. Chapter three presents the Mitra-Wan tree farm model 
with carbon subsidies by Tahvonen and Rautiainen (2017), expanded with multiple land classes (Salo 
and Tahvonen 2002). Numerical results analyze first the effects of a mutual subsidy scheme with two 
land classes and second the effects of a unilateral subsidy scheme and its market implications. Poor 
and fertile forestland are compared throughout the analysis to evaluate the role of forest productivity 
in carbon sequestration programs.  
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2 Carbon Sequestration in a Stand-Level Optimization Problem 
This chapter presents the traditional Faustmann model (see e.g. Samuelson 1976) for calculating the 
optimal forest rotation length for a single stand when the forest’s carbon storage is taken into account 
(E.g. Van Kooten et al. 1995). The price per ton of carbon (CO2) is denoted by Pc, which can represent 
the social cost of carbon in a society or a price of carbon dioxide in an emission trading scheme. 
Carbon storages are interpret as positive externalities that are subsidized to reach their socially 
optimal level. For the landowner, the problem is to maximize the net income from both timber 
production and carbon sequestration subsidies. It is assumed that the initial state is bare land. The 
model does not take natural regeneration or thinnings into account and yields somewhat 
unrealistically short rotation periods.  
 
2.1 Model 
The stand volume (m3 ha-1) is given as a function F of stand age t. The function satisfies the conditions 
 𝐹 ∈ 𝐶$, 𝐹(0) = 0, 𝐹*(0) = 0, 𝐹(𝑡) > 0	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝐹*(𝑡) > 0	𝑓𝑜𝑟	𝑎𝑙𝑙	𝑡 > 0, 𝐹*(𝑡) → 0	𝑎𝑛𝑑	𝐹 →𝐹6		𝑎𝑠	𝑡 → ∞,	  
F” > 0 for 0 < t < ?̂?,   F” < 0 for  t > ?̂? and  :”:< is decreasing in t,   (A1)  
 
where ?̂? notes the culmination age where the stand growth is fastest and 𝐹6 is the volume where the 
stand growth has reached its maturity. An example of a biological growth function that satisfies A1 
is written 
 𝐹(𝑡) = 𝛼>(1 − 𝑒BCDE)CF, 
 
 where 𝛼> > 0 is the asymptote, i.e. the level 𝐹(𝑡) approaches as 𝑡 → ∞ and 𝛼G > 0, and 𝛼$ > 0  are 
empirical growth parameters. Figure 1 shows the development of stand volume 𝐹 in time t. The 
parameters equal 𝛼> = 465, 𝛼G = 0,07, and	𝛼$ = 17,6. 
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Figure 1. Stand volume function F. 
 
When the stand is young, the function F is increasing and convex and turns to increasing and concave 
after reaching the culmination age denoted by ?̂?.   
 
The objective of the Faustmann model is to maximize bare land value 𝐽M by optimizing the forest 
rotation length in t 
 𝐽M(𝑡) = BNOP:(E)QRST>BQRST        (1) 
 
where the stumpage price 𝑝 ≥ 0 (€ per m3) is constant, implying linear utility, 𝑤 ≥ 0	denotes 
regeneration cost per hectare and 𝑟 ≥ 0 is the interest rate. The first order condition of (1) is 
 𝐽M* (𝑡) = 𝑝𝐹*(𝑡) − 𝑟𝑝𝐹(𝑡) − 𝑟𝐽M(𝑡) = 0, 
 
which can be interpret as follows: it is optimal to clearcut the stand when the marginal value of stand 
growth 𝑝𝐹*(𝑡)	equals the interest costs of postponing the harvest 𝑟𝑝𝐹(𝑡)	and the interest costs of 
postponing the revenues of all future harvests 𝑟𝐽M(𝑡). Solving t in 𝐽M* (𝑡) = 0 gives us the optimal 
clearcut age t* and 𝐽M(𝑡∗) is the maximized bare land value of the forest stand.   
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Let the price of carbon per cubic meter of commercial timber to be denoted by 𝜏 and write 𝜏 = 𝛿𝑝[, 
where 𝛿 is the carbon content of one cubic meter and 𝑝[ is the social cost of carbon.  The parameter 𝛽	(0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1) is the present value of the release of carbon from harvested timber products, i.e. the 
rate of decay. If 𝛽 = 1, all carbon from the harvested timber is released immediately. If 𝛽 = 0, carbon 
is stored forever in the end-products. The economic value of carbon intake of a forest stand over 
infinite chain of rotations 𝐽[(𝑡), presented similarly by van Kooten (1995), is written as 
 𝐽[(𝑡) = ∫ _T` :<(a)QRSbcaB_d:(E)QRST>BQRST         (2) 
 
where ∫ 𝜏Ee 𝐹*(𝑠)𝑒Bfa𝑑𝑠 is the value of the change in carbon net flow and 	𝜏𝛽𝐹(𝑡)𝑒BfE is the value of 
carbon released upon harvest. To combine the optimal timber production and carbon sequestration 
problem, we write 
 
max{Eke} 𝐽M(𝑡) + 𝐽[(𝑡) = −𝑤 + 𝑝𝐹(𝑡)𝑒BfE1 − 𝑒BfE + ∫ 𝜏Ee 𝐹*(𝑠)𝑒Bfa𝑑𝑠 − 𝜏𝛽𝐹(𝑡)𝑒BfE1 − 𝑒BfE  
 
  max{Eke}	 𝐽(𝑡) = BNO_ ∫ :<(a)QRSbT` caOQRST(PB_d):(E)>BQRST . 
   (3) 
 
 Using the Leibniz’s formula for integrals (see e.g. Kaplan 1973), we can differentiate (3) with respect 
to t and write the optimality condition as 
 𝐽*(𝑡) = [PO(>Bd)_]:<(E)Bf[(PB_d):(E)Op(E)]>BQRST = 0, 
    (4) 
 
where the denumerator 1 − 𝑒BfE is always positive for any finite t > 0 and r > 0. The first order 
condition shows that it is optimal to harvest the stand when the value of marginal growth [𝑝 + (1 − 𝛽)𝜏]𝐹*(𝑡) equals the interest costs r of postponing the clearcut (𝑝 − 𝜏𝛽)𝐹(𝑡) and 
postponing the revenues of all the future harvests 𝐽(𝑡). The finiteness and uniqueness of the optimal 
rotation is proven in Tahvonen and Rautiainen (2017). If 𝛽 = 1 and r > 0, a positive carbon price 
Û
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lengthens the rotation period and shortens it if 𝛽 < 1, r = 0 and w > 0.  In this thesis, we use 𝛽 values 
of 1 and 0.822 when r = 0.03 and 1 and 0.933 when r = 0.01. 
 
Proposition 1. Given 𝐹(𝑡) = 𝛼>𝑓(𝑡), where 𝑓(𝑡) satisfies A1, the maximum volume of the stand 𝛼> 
decreases the optimal rotation period t* when r > 0 and w > 0. 
 
Proof. Write (10) as 
 𝐻(𝑡, 𝛼>	) = [PO(>Bd)_]CsM*(E)>BQRST − f(PB_d)CsM(E)>BQRST − 𝑟 BN(>BQRST)D − f_Cs ∫ [M*(E)QRSb]T` caOQRST(PB_d)CsM(E)(>BQRST)D = 0. 
   (5) 
Dividing by 𝛼> yields 
 𝐻(𝑡, 𝛼>	) = [PO(>Bd)_]M*(E)>BQRST − f(PB_d)M(E)>BQRST − 𝑟 Rtus(>BQRST)D − f_ ∫ [M*(E)QRSb]T` caOQRST(PB_d)M(E)(>BQRST)D = 0.    (6) 
 
 
Differentiate (12) with respect to 𝛼> to get 
 vwvCs=−𝑟 txsD(>BQRST)D < 0	for all r > 0, w > 0. 
 
Given that 𝐽′(𝑡∗) = 0, we write 
 vwvE=[PO(>Bd)_]CsM**(E)Bf[(PB_d)]CsM*(E)(>BQRST) , 
 
As shown in Tahvonen & Rautiainen (2017),  vwvE  is negative when 𝑓(𝑡) satisfies A1. By using implicit 
function theorem we get 
 
vE∗vCs = − Bf
txsDzsR{RST|D(	>BQRST)Rs}[PO(>Bd)_]CsM**(E)Bf[(PB_d)]CsM*(E)~ < 0 for all r > 0, w > 0.     (7) 
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Thus, with a positive interest rate and regeneration cost, the optimal rotation is a decreasing function 
of the maximum stand volume. As the maximum stand volume increases, the optimal rotation period 
decreases. With lower values of 𝛼>, the optimal rotation is longer.  ∎  
 
2.2 Numerical results 
Let us compare the effect of a positive carbon price on fertile and poor forest sites. The growth 
function parameters are derived from the data of Motti simulator developed by the Natural Resource 
Institute of Finland (Luonnonvarakeskus, 2019) and represent the growth of pure Norway spruce 
stand in the Southern Finland (fertile forest) and pure Scots pine stand in Lapland (poor forest).  
 
Figure 2. Fertile forest and poor forest stand volume functions. 
Note. The parameter values are 𝛼> = 465, 𝛼G = 0,07, and	𝛼$ = 17,6 for the fertile forest and 𝛼> =305, 𝛼G = 0,04, and	𝛼$ = 7,2 for the poor forest. 
 
Stumpage price is 45€ at the fertile site and 25,50€ at the poor site, derived from the end-product 
averages of Motti simulator. Regeneration costs are 1500€ and 300€ respectively, assuming that they 
are lower at the poor site due to different regeneration practices. The calculations are made using 
Maple-software (version 2019).  
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The numerical results in Table 1 show that the optimal rotation period is shorter in the fertile forest 
stand and longer in the poor forest stand (proposition 1). A positive carbon price lengthens the rotation 
period and increases the amount of carbon sequestered in both sites. Note that we use the discounted 
value of carbon tons sequestered in the forest, as there is a time preference in the release of carbon 
into the atmosphere. With moderate CO2 prices the annual timber production increases, as shown 
previously in detailed models by optimized thinning by Pihlainen et al. (2014) and Pohjola and Valsta 
(2007). This indicates that the economically optimal rotation period without carbon subsidies is 
shorter than the rotation implying Maximum Sustainable Yield (later MSY). The result underlines 
the importance of economic optimization, as the result contradicts with some ecological studies 
showing that an increase in carbon sequestration leads inevitably to a decrease in timber harvests (cf. 
Kaipainen et al. 2004, Liski et al. 2001). A sufficiently high carbon price results in a scenario where 
the whole stand is left unharvested (Figures 3 a,b). This suggests that the optimal management regime 
of the forest changes from clearcut to forest conservation. In all examples, the poor forest is left under 
conservation with lower price of carbon than the fertile forest. 
 
The cost of an additional ton of CO2 stored is calculated by comparing the losses of timber net 
revenues to the additional tons of carbon sequestered (Table 1). With lower prices of CO2, the cost 
per ton of an additional CO2 stored is higher at the poor site. Tahvonen and Rautiainen (2017) prove 
analytically that a positive price of carbon lengthens the rotation period when r > 0. Our results show 
that the price of carbon lengthens the optimal rotation period more at the poor forest stand due to the 
lower slope of the growth function at t*, i.e. slower forest growth leads to a greater change in the 
optimal rotation. When	𝑟 > 0 and 𝜏 > 0, longer optimal rotation period leads to lower timber income 
due to discounting. Higher decrease in the net present value of timber production leads to a higher 
cost of additional CO2 stored. When the CO2 price is high enough to allocate the poor forestland 
solely for carbon storage purposes, an additional ton of CO2 stored is more costly to the forest owner 
in the fertile site. This suggests that the initial BLV is higher at the fertile site and the loss of income 
due to increased carbon sequestration is higher with higher values of 𝜏. (Table 1.) 
 
 If 𝛽 < 1, the optimal rotation period is shorter and a part of the carbon remains in timber products 
and decreases the cost of additional CO2 stored. The effect of 𝛽 < 1 on the optimal rotation period is 
stronger in the poor forest stand (Figure 3a). This is due to a lower slope of F(t) in the poor forest 
stand at t* and results in relatively higher decrease in the cost of additional CO2 stored. However, 
when the forest stand is under conservation, 𝛽 = 1 results in lower cost of additional CO2 stored than 𝛽 < 1 due to a lower initial amount of stored CO2 in the forest stand. When the carbon units stored 
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in timber products are accounted, the baseline carbon storage is higher and the maximum additional 
sequestration lower, increasing the cost of additional carbon units stored when the stand is under 
conservation.  These results underline the importance of the method used for carbon accounting, since 
it has different effects on the optimal solution depending on the stand productivity. 
 
Forestry becomes more profitable for forest owners at both sites when a carbon subsidy -scheme is 
applied. From the social planner’s perspective, carbon subsidies can be very costly and thus the 
scheme should be based on additionality (Table 1).Given the future carbon price range estimations 
by Cai et al. (2015) and Nordhaus (2017), most scenarios presented in our examples would lead to 
forest conservation (Figures 3a,b). However, we can conclude that the stand-level analysis leaves 
much to be questioned due to the simplicity of the model used. In the next chapter, we extend the 
analysis to a market-level optimization problem where timber price is endogenous and alternative 
land use is taken into account. 
  
Figure 3. Optimal rotation periods with different interest rates and rates of decay for (a) the poor site 
and (b) the fertile site.  
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Table 1. Carbon subsidies in poor and fertile forest stand. 
(A) (B) (C) (D)
(E = C + 
D)
(F = D - A * 
G0) (G = D / A) (H)
(I = C0 - C / 
G - G0)
Site
CO2 
price 
(€* t-1)
Rotation 
period 
(years)
NPV of 
timber 
income 
(€*ha-1)
Total 
subsidies 
(€*ha-1)
Total 
Revenue 
(€*ha-1)
Subsidies 
based on 
additionality 
(€*ha-1)
Present 
value of 
carbon 
stored (CO2 
t*ha-1)
Annual 
wood 
production 
(m3*ha-1)
Cost of 
additional 
CO2 stored 
(€*tCO2
-1)
Poor forest 0 70 72 0 72 0 9,8 1,7 0
20 91 10 310 320 114 15,5 2 10,9
40 Inf.* -300 1022 722 630 25,6 0 23,6
60 Inf. -300 1534 1234 945 25,6 0 23,6
80 Inf. -300 2045 1745 1260 25,6 0 23,6
Fertile forest 0 48 2253 0 2253 0 31,9 6,3 0
20 51 2192 753 2945 115 37,7 6,5 10,3
40 56 1965 1805 3770 529 45,1 6,6 21,7
60 64 1427 3345 4772 1429 55,7 6,4 34,6
80 88 -35 6090 6055 3536 76,1 5,2 51,7
Note: Parameter values are r = 0.03, β = 1. 
 * marks the situation when forest is allocated solely for carbon storage purposes.
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3 Carbon Sequestration in a Market-Level Optimization Problem 
This chapter presents the market-level age-class forestry model studied in Mitra and Wan (1985, 
1986) extended to include multiple land classes, carbon storage, and land allocation between forestry 
and an alternative land use, such as agriculture (Salo and Tahvonen 2002, 2004; M.A. Cunha-e-Sá et 
al. 2013, Piazza and Roy 2015, Tahvonen and Rautiainen 2017).  The social planning problem is 
similar to Tahvonen and Rautiainen (2017), but expanded with multiple land classes (Salo and 
Tahvonen 2002).   
 
3.1 Model 
Different forest land areas are divided into classes i = 1,…,h. The age classes are denoted by s = 
1,…,n, where all stands aged n or older are allocated to class n. Note that in the presence of carbon 
price, trees in class n have economic value and may remain unharvested. The area allocated to age-
class s in forest land class i at the beginning of period t is xist, t = 0,1… . The area allocated for 
alternative land use is denoted by yit for each forest land class i. Total land area in each class i equals 
one. The volume of harvestable timber per hectare in land class i and age class s is fis, with 
assumptions 
 𝑓> ≥ 0, 𝑓a < 𝑓,aO> for s = 1,…,n – 2, and 𝑓,B> = 𝑓. 
 
The per period harvest of all forest land classes at the end of the period t is 
 𝑐E = ∑ ∑ 𝑓az𝑥aE − 𝑥,aO>,EO>| + 𝑓z𝑥E + 𝑥,B>,E − 𝑥,EO>|BGa>> .   (8) 
 
 Note that because stand volume does not grow in age classes older than n - 1, and unharvested land 
area of age n stays in that age class, the timber yield from harvesting the two oldest age classes 
equals  
 𝑓z𝑥E + 𝑥,B>,E − 𝑥,EO>|. 
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The price per ton of carbon and the carbon content of one m3 of timber is denoted by 𝜏 and 𝛿, 
respectively. The total carbon volume C in all forest classes at the beginning of period t equals 
 𝐶 = 𝛿}∑ ∑ 𝑓a𝑥aEa>> ~.      (9) 
 
The parameter  𝛽	(0 ≤ 𝛽 ≤ 1)  is the present value of the release of carbon from harvested timber 
products as in the stand level model. The per period net carbon inflow in all living trees and timber 
products equals 
 𝜏𝛿 ∑ 𝑄E> = 𝜏𝛿 ∑ }∑ 𝑓az𝑥a,EO> − 𝑥aE| + (1 − 𝛽)𝑐Ea> ~>    (10) 
 
The utility from timber consumption U (U’ > 0, U” < 0) is derived from the inverse demand function 
Dc(ct) and can be given as 𝑈(𝑐E) = ∫ 𝐷[(𝑐)𝑑𝑐[Te .  Similarly, the utility from the alternative use of land 
W (W’ > 0, W” < 0) is derived from Dy(yt) and written 𝑊(𝑦E) = ∫ 𝐷(𝑦)𝑑𝑦Te . The discount factor 
is denoted by b (0 < b < 1) and the social maximization problem is written 
 
max{bT,>,…,,a>,…,,Ee,>,… } 𝑉 =𝑏E 𝑈(𝑐E) +𝑊(𝑦E) + 𝜏𝛿𝑄E>> Ee  
(11) 
subject to 
 𝑥,aO>,EO> ≤ 𝑥aE, 𝑠 = 1,… , 𝑛 − 2 and 𝑥,EO> ≤ 𝑥E + 𝑥,B>,E, 
 (12) ∑ 𝑥aE ≤ 1a> , 
(13) 𝑥aE ≥ 0, 𝑖 = 1,… , ℎ, 𝑠 = 1,… , 𝑛, 
(14) 𝑥ae ≥ 0, 𝑖 = 1,… , ℎ, 𝑠 = 1,… , 𝑛,	 and given, 
(15) 𝑦E = 1 − ∑ 𝑥aEa> . 
(16) 
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The social planner’s problem is to maximize the present value of utility from harvesting forests of 
different age classes, allocating land between forestry and other uses, and storing carbon in living 
trees or in timber products if 𝛽 < 1. If h = 1, the problem is similar to that in Tahvonen and Rautiainen 
(2017). The Lagrangian for the problem is 
 𝐿 = ∑ 𝑏EEe }𝑈(𝑐E) + ∑ 𝑊(𝑦E) + 𝜏𝛿 ∑ 𝑄E + ∑ 𝜆E(1 − ∑ 𝑥a,EO>) +a>>>>∑ ∑ 𝑃aEz𝑥aE − 𝑥,aO>,EO>| + ∑ 𝑃,B>,Ez𝑥E + 𝑥,B>,E − 𝑥,EO>|>BGa>> ~,  (17) 
 
 where 𝜆E, 𝑖 = 1,… , ℎ, 𝑡 = 0,1, …	and 𝑃aE, 𝑖 = 1,… , ℎ, 𝑠 = 1,… , 𝑛, 𝑡 = 0,1, … are the Lagrangian 
multipliers. Multipliers 𝜆E represent the value of marginal land in various land classes and  𝑝aE 
represents the marginal value of forest land in age class s of the land class i in the beginning of period 
t+1. For notation purposes, let 𝐹a = ∑ 𝑓a>  denote the total forest growth in age class s. 
 
The Kuhn-Tucker conditions for 𝑡 = 0,1, … are  
 𝑏BE vv,s,Ts = 𝑏𝐹>𝑈*(𝑐EO>) − 𝑏∑ 𝑊*z𝑦,EO>| − ∑ 𝜆E + 𝑏 ∑ 𝑃,>,EO> + 𝜏𝛿𝐹>(1 − 𝑏𝛽)>>> ≤ 0,          
(18) 𝑏BE vv,bs,Ts = −𝐹a𝑈*(𝑐E) + 𝑏𝐹aO>𝑈*(𝑐EO>) − 𝑏∑ 𝑊*z𝑦,EO>| − ∑ 𝜆E − ∑ 𝑃aE +>>>𝑏 ∑ 𝑃,aO>,EO> +> 𝜏𝛿[𝐹aO>(1 − 𝑏𝛽) − 𝐹a(1 − 𝛽)] ≤ 0 for s = 1,…,n – 2,     (19) 
 𝑏BE vv, ,Ts = −𝐹𝑈*(𝑐E) + 𝑏𝐹𝑈*(𝑐EO>) − 𝑏 ∑ 𝑊*z𝑦,EO>| − ∑ 𝜆E − ∑ 𝑃,B>,E +>>>𝑏 ∑ 𝑃,B>,EO> +> 𝜏𝛿𝐹𝛽(1 − 𝑏) ≤ 0,      (20) 
 𝑥a,EO> ≥ 0, 𝑥a,EO> vvb,Ts = 0, 𝑠 = 1,… , 𝑛,    (21) 
 𝑃aE ≥ 0, 𝑃aEz𝑥aE − 𝑥,aO>,EO>| = 0, 𝑠 = 1,… , 𝑛 − 2;	𝑃,B>,Ez𝑋E + 𝑋,B>,E − 𝑥,EO>| = 0, (22) 
 𝜆E ≥ 0, 	𝜆E(1 − ∑ 𝑥a,EO>) = 0a> .     (23) 
  
 Using the Lagrange method in dynamic optimization is presented in detail by Chow (1997). Salo and 
Tahvonen (2002) provide a full proof for the existence of a cyclical stationary state for any number 
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of land and age classes when all land is allocated to forestry. If it is optimal to allocate a share of the 
land for the alternative use, the cycles vanish and the forest age class allocation move towards a steady 
state, as proven in Salo and Tahvonen (2004) with one land class. M.A. Cunha-e-Sá et al. (2013) and 
Tahvonen and Rautiainen (2017) show the existence of a stationary state when carbon subsidies are 
applied but for a model with one land class only.  
 
Stationary cycles 
The Faustmann rotation age of a forest land class i is denoted by mi (1 < mi < ni)  and satisfies 
 £¤M¤(>B£¤) ≥ £bMb(>B£b) for s = 1,…, n,.     (24) 
 
If the Faustmann rotation age is the optimal solution for the problems (12) - (15) when xi0 = xi, the 
age class structure xi for every land class type i has the property 𝑥 ∈ 𝑆, and xis = 0  for si = mi + 
1,…,ni,  a forest is called an Optimal Faustmann Forest (OFF). An OFF is called an interior Optimal 
Faustmann Forest if xis > 0 for s = 1,…,mi, i = 1,…,h. Salo and Tahvonen (2002) proves that besides 
the normal forest solution when xi = (1/mi,…,1/mi,0,…,0), there are other OFFs with uneven land 
allocation structures between land classes which lead to cyclical timber output. Mitra and Wan (1986) 
show that with one land class and a 0 % interest rate the optimal solution converges towards a normal 
forest state. This may not hold with multiple land classes, as proven in Salo and Tahvonen (2002). If 
land classes i and j have optimal rotation periods 𝑚 ≠ 𝑚¨ with a common divisor	𝑚* greater than 1, 
there is a continuum of stationary age-class structures in addition to the normal forest state (Salo and 
Tahvonen, 2002). Numerical results in Salo & Tahvonen (2002) show that, with 𝑚* > 1 and no 
discounting, the solution converges towards a cyclical stationary state with an even total timber flow. 
With discounting, the cycle radius in the solution increases and the total timber flow turns cyclical. 
When h=1 and the optimal solution has land in alternative use, the forestland converges towards a 
normal forest structure also under discounting (Salo and Tahvonen, 2004). Note that the model in 
Salo and Tahvonen (2002) with multiple land classes does not include alternative land use. Cyclicality 
of the steady state with multiple land classes and alternative land use has not been studied in literature 
before. 
 
Due to the strictly concave utility function and diminishing marginal returns, a cyclical timber outflow 
yields utility losses. Salo and Tahvonen (2004) describe three possibilities for smoothening the 
cyclical age-class structure towards a normal forest state. It is possible to clearcut the stand in an age 
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class before or after the optimal rotation age class. In addition, it is possible to smoothen the cycle by 
postponing replanting and leaving part of the land bare. However, with a positive discount rate, the 
marginal costs from smoothing the harvesting cycle are always positive and exceed the marginal 
utility from smoother timber flow when the solution is arbitrarily close to the normal forest (Salo and 
Tahvonen 2004). This explains why the optimal solution is cyclical when all land is allocated to 
forestry. In the presence of an alternative land use, smoothing the cycles by land allocation is possible 
without utility losses (Salo and Tahvonen 2004).  
 
Due to the complexity of the mathematical analysis of the model, we focus on the numerical analysis 
with two land classes, i.e. h = 2. Parameters for harvestable timber volume 𝑓a represent the poor and 
fertile forest volume functions in the stand-level chapter. First, we examine the stationary state 
solutions without applying carbon subsidies. Both forestlands supply timber to the same markets and 
have a possibility to allocate land for alternative use. In the second step, we present the first-best 
policy scenario where both land classes are placed under the same carbon subsidy scheme and next 
the second-best policy -scenarios, where a unilateral carbon policy is implemented on one of the land 
classes. We examine the concept of leakage and show how a unilateral subsidy scheme affects the 
optimal solution of other forests in the market.
 
 
 
1) The utility function parameters are 𝑈(𝑐E) = 𝑐e.©,𝑊1(𝑦E) = 10𝑦e.ª,𝑊2(𝑦E) = 2𝑦e.ª. For forest growth parameters, see Appendix 1. 
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3.2 Numerical Results 
The model is solved as a nonlinear dynamic optimization problem applying AMPL programming 
language and Knitro optimization software (version 11.1.0). Length of the time horizon is 200 5-year 
periods. Both forestland classes consist of 24 five-year age classes s and supply timber to the same 
markets 𝑈(𝑐E), implying that their timber products are perfect substitutes. Age classes are harvested 
at the end of the 5-year period and the optimal harvesting age is noted in years (i.e. if clearcut is 
carried out on age class 9, the optimal rotation is 45 years). In addition, we assume that the alternative 
land uses are independent between land classes, i.e. 𝑊(𝑦E), 𝑖 = 1. . ℎ.1 
 
Examples without carbon policy 
Let us first examine the equilibrium stationary state solutions without applying carbon subsidies. 
Computation shows that, when r = 0.03, OFF’s for fertile and poor forest are 𝑚> = 45 and 𝑚G = 65, 
respectively. In Figures 4 a,b  it is assumed that r = 0.03 and the initial land allocation 𝑥ae is the 
stationary state solution. The blocks in Figure 4a represent the age class structures of the fertile forest 
(left side) and the poor forest (right side). The length of the individual bars represent the fraction of 
land (z-axis) allocated to age class s (x-axis) in time t (y-axis). Both of the age classes follow their 
OFF’s and converge towards a cyclical age-class structure and harvests, resulting in an even total 
flow of timber (Figure 4b). Land allocation between forestry and alternative land use is cyclical in 
both land classes (Figure 5). Computation shows that the initial age-class structure does not affect the 
land allocation in the equilibrium, as shown in Salo and Tahvonen (2004) with one land class and in 
the absence of land conversion costs.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
24 
(a) 
 
 
 
Figure 4a,b. Stationary state (a) age-class structures and (b) harvests. 
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Figure 5. Stationary state land allocation. 
 
The result suggests that, with multiple land classes, it is optimal to allocate land between forestry and 
alternative land use so that the total timber output converges towards a steady state with an even 
timber flow. With a 1% interest rate the stationary state harvests and land allocation are less cyclical 
(Figure 6). The result implies that the cyclicality in harvests of each land class and in land allocation 
bears utility losses and vanishes as the interest rate approaches zero, as in the examples with one land 
class (see Salo and Tahvonen 2002).  
 
Figure 6. Stationary state harvests when interest rate is 1%. 
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First-best solutions with carbon policy 
Let us analyze an example where a mutual carbon subsidy scheme is applied to both land classes. In 
Figures 7 a,b it is assumed that r = 0.03, 𝜏 = 0, 0.1, 0.3, 0.5, 0.8, 𝛽 = 1, and the initial age-class 
allocation is the equilibrium steady state without carbon subsidies. Carbon subsidies applied to both 
forestlands result in longer rotation periods, as shown in the stand level analysis, and afforestation, 
as studied analytically in García et al. (2018). As afforestation is possible only in the first age-class, 
it results in high cyclicality over the transition period. At a carbon price of 0.1, the cycles smoothen 
over time, resulting in a new equilibrium stationary state and even total timber flow (Figures 8a,b). 
Transition to longer rotation periods decreases harvests for the transition period but results in a higher 
timber supply in the steady state. Higher timber supply leads to a decrease in timber price. When the 
carbon price is 0.5, the poor forest is allocated solely for carbon storage purposes and fertile forest 
converges towards normal forest state (Figure 7b). At a carbon price of 0.8, part of the fertile forest 
is left unharvested and the rest is clearcut at age class n-1, a scenario  proven analytically in  Tahvonen 
and Rautiainen (2017).  
 
 
  (a) 
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(b) 
 
 
Figure 7a,b. Age-class structure development of (a) fertile and (b) poor forest with different carbon 
prices. 
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Figures 8a,b. (a) transition period harvests and (b) stationary state harvests under carbon subsidy. 
Note. Parameter values are r = 0.03, 𝜏 = 0.1, and 𝛽 =1. 
 
 
At a carbon price of 0.3, cycles in the optimal solution does not smoothen and the total harvest 
converges towards a cyclical stationary state (Figure 9). Computation shows that, with a carbon price 
of 0.3, the OFF for poor forest is 95 years. Now, with both forests supplying timber to the same 
markets, poor forest is clearcut at 115 years. This suggests that the stumpage price is set lower by the 
fertile forest supplying the majority of timber in the market, which lengthens the optimal rotation of 
the poor forest. The poor forest takes the stumpage price as given and follows the optimal solution 
almost as if the utility function was linear. When the utility function is linear, each sub-plot of the 
forestland follows a periodic Faustmann solution as in the stand-level model and does not converge 
towards a normal forest state (see Mitra and Wan 1985). This explains the large cyclicality of the 
solution and further supports the notion that cyclicality is a rather fundamental phenomenon in forest 
economics (cf. Salo & Tahvonen 2004). 
 
Table 2 shows landowner’s income under carbon subsidies. The initial age-class allocation is the 
equilibrium steady state without carbon subsidies and the annual timber production average is 
approximated from the new equilibrium steady state. The net present value of carbon subsidies is 
based on additionality (see Tahvonen and Rautiainen 2017). Moderate carbon prices increase the 
income from forestry due to afforestation and increase timber output. Afforestation leads to a decrease 
in income from alternative land use. Sufficiently high carbon prices lead to a decrease in the income 
from forestry as the rotation period lengthen. The effects of the carbon subsidies are stronger in the 
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poor site, as shown in the stand-level analysis. In addition to the stand-level analysis, the market-level 
example shows that an increase in carbon price may induce afforestation also in forests under 
conservation (Table 2). Lower interest rate decreases the effects of carbon subsidies. When 𝛽 < 1, 
forestry is more profitable under carbon policy and clearcut is optimal at higher carbon prices. 
 
The cost of an additional unit of CO2 stored is calculated by comparing the loss of income from both 
forestry and alternative land use to the increase in the carbon storage (Table 2). In line with the stand-
level analysis, the cost of an additional unit of stored CO2 is higher in the poor forest site until the 
forest is under conservation. Slower growth rate leads to longer rotation periods and the decrease in 
timber income is higher due to discounting. After the poor forest is under conservation, an additional 
unit of stored CO2 is more expensive in the fertile site due to greater losses in timber income.  
 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Stationary state harvests with carbon price 0.3.  
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Table 2. Mutual carbon subsidies in poor and fertile forestland. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Second-best solutions and carbon leakage 
 
In economics, a theory of the second-best policy concerns a situation when the optimal solution (first-
best policy) cannot be applied (Lipsey and Lancaster 1956). In our context, second-best policy would 
be a unilateral subsidy scheme as the parties fail to form a mutual policy. The market-level model 
allows us to study the effects of unilateral carbon policy outside the policy area, which can be 
compared to previous economic studies on carbon leakage based on market-level models which do 
not consider the dynamics of forest growth (cf. Murray et al. 2004, Gan and McCarl 2007).  
 
García et al. (2018) present the concepts of positive and negative carbon leakage between open-access 
and commercial forestry. Positive leakage occurs when a unilateral carbon sequestration policy leads 
to an increase in carbon emissions outside the policy area. If the carbon sequestration policy leads to 
a decrease in carbon emissions outside the policy area, negative leakage has occurred. Garcia et al. 
(2018) show analytically how negative leakage may occur between a commercially managed forest, 
where a carbon policy leads to afforestation, and an open-access forest, where a carbon policy leads 
to conservation. Note that García et al. (2018) do not consider the case where a sufficiently high 
carbon price leads to conservation in commercial forestry, as shown in our previous examples.  
 
(A) (B) (C) (D) (E)
(F = C + D 
+ E) (G) (H) (I) (I)
Site
CO2 
price
Rotation 
period 
(years)
NPV 
timber 
income(
€)
NPV of 
alternative 
land use(€)
NPV of carbon 
subsidies(€)
Total 
income (€)
Present value 
of carbon 
stored (tCO2)
Area 
allocated 
to forestry
Annual 
wood 
production 
avg.
Cost of 
additional 
CO2 stored 
(€)
0 65 10,1 6 0 16,1 9,3 0,48 3,6 0
0,1 75 10,5 5 0,6 16,1 15,1 0,6 5,5 0,1
0,3 115 7,3 3,3 8,3 18,9 37,1 0,8 10,1 0,19
0,5 Inf. 0,1 2,2 33,6 35,9 57,8 0,9 0 0,28
0,8 Inf. 0 1,6 40,5 42,1 60,0 0,95 0 0,29
0 45 47 25,2 0 72,2 35,7 0,58 17,3 0
0,1 50 47,8 23,1 1,4 72,3 49,3 0,63 20,3 0,09
0,3 55 49 17,9 10,3 77,2 70,2 0,75 24,8 0,15
0,5 70 43,9 13,3 24,3 81,5 102,8 0,85 25,5 0,22
0,8 115* 15,2 9 106,6 130,8 168,9 0,92 6,7 0,36
Note: Parameter values are r = 0.03, β = 1. 
 * marks the situation when a part of the forestland is allocated under conservation.
Poor 
forest
Fertile 
forest
 
 
31 
Let us first study the effect of a unilateral policy between two identical forests. In Figure 10 it is 
assumed that r = 0.03, 𝛽 = 1, and both forests have a high productivity. The initial age-class allocation 
is the stationary state without carbon subsidies. The bars in Figure 10 show the percentual leakage in 
the carbon emissions to the outside of the policy area with different carbon prices. The amount of 
leakage is calculated by comparing the increase in the present value of carbon tons sequestered inside 
the policy to the decrease in the sequestered carbon outside the policy. Again, we use the present 
value of carbon tons stored due to the time preference, i.e. the carbon tons sequestered now are valued 
higher than in the future, as the negative impacts of carbon in the atmosphere accumulate. In our 
examples, the rate of time preference equals the market interest rate. As shown in Figure 10, moderate 
carbon prices increase the carbon emissions outside the policy area, i.e. the carbon policy leads to 
positive carbon leakage. Moderate carbon subsidies lead to afforestation and an increase in timber 
output inside the policy area, which leads to a decrease in timber price and cause deforestation in 
other areas providing timber to the same markets. A sufficiently high carbon price leads to forest 
conservation, which in turn increase the timber price in the markets, inducing afforestation and 
negative carbon leakage outside the policy area (Figure 10). 
 
 
Figure 10. Leakage in carbon emissions due to a unilateral carbon policy. 
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a higher increase in carbon emissions outside the policy area. A higher price of carbon stored in the 
poor forest lengthen the rotation period so that the positive carbon leakage decreases outside the 
policy area (Figure 11a). The effect of carbon price is opposite when the fertile site is under a carbon 
policy: lower prices of carbon have a smaller effect on the optimal forestry, thus inducing less leakage. 
Higher carbon prices in the fertile forest increase timber output and cause deforestation outside the 
policy area (Figure 11b). In both examples, a sufficiently high carbon price leads to forest 
conservation and causes afforestation and negative carbon leakage outside the policy area. 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11 a,b.  Leakage in carbon emissions due to a unilateral carbon policy implemented (a) in the 
poor forest and (b) in the fertile forest. 
 
In contrast with the first-best policy examples, in both fertile and poor forest the optimal management 
regime changes from clearcut to forest conservation at the same carbon price 0.8. As the fertile forest 
does not increase its timber supply outside the policy, the timber price stays at a higher lever and it is 
optimal to clearcut the poor forest with a higher carbon price. Similarly, the timber supply of the poor 
forest outside the policy decrease the timber price also at the carbon price of 0.8, leaving the fertile 
forest unharvested earlier than in the first-best policy. Although these results are dependent on the 
forest growth parameters and the utility function 𝑈(𝑐E) and cannot be generalized as such, it gives us 
some intuition that the change in the optimal management regime is affected by a) the carbon price, 
b) the diversity of the forests supplying timber to the markets, and by c) the extent of the carbon 
policy.  
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Figures 12 a,b show the cost of an additional ton of sequestered carbon and the amount of additional 
carbon sequestered in different policy scenarios. The cost of carbon tons is derived from the total 
losses of income of all land-owners and compared to the total amount of additional carbon 
sequestered. Intuitively, the amount of sequestered carbon and the cost per additional ton of carbon 
increase as the carbon subsidy increases. A mutual carbon policy for both forestlands leads to the 
highest amount of additional carbon sequestered. A unilateral policy implemented on the poor forest 
leads to the smallest cost and to the smallest amount of carbon sequestered. The costs are the highest 
when the fertile forest is under a unilateral carbon policy. The results suggest that the cost of an 
additional unit of carbon stored is dependent on the total amount of carbon sequestered and on the 
extent of the carbon policy. 
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Figures 12 a,b.  (a) The cost of an additional ton of carbon sequestered and (b) the amount of 
additional carbon sequestered in different policy scenarios.  
Note. Parameter values are r = 0.03, and 𝛽 =1. 
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4 Discussion 
The numerical examples of the stand-level model yield results that are in line with the previous 
economic literature. A positive carbon price lengthens the rotation period when the interest rate is 
positive and decay rate is one. A high enough carbon price leads to an optimal solution where the 
stand is not clearcut at all. Lower decay rate shortens the optimal rotation period and increases the 
income from subsidies. Carbon subsidies can be very costly to the society and should be based on 
additionality, as presented in Tahvonen & Rautiainen (2017). A moderate carbon price may increase 
the annual timber output of a forest stand, implying that the optimal rotation without carbon subsidies 
is not at the MSY level. Average cost per additional unit of CO2 stored is lower at the high 
productivity forest stand until the point where the stand of poor productivity is allocated solely for 
carbon storage purposes. These results are in line with Pihlainen et al. (2014) but contradicts with 
Niinimäki et al. (2013), where the less fertile site was more cost-efficient with moderate carbon 
prices. The model in Niinimäki et al. (2013) include thinnings and show that the role of thinnings are 
stronger at the poor site. All the effects of carbon subsidies on the optimal solution are stronger in the 
poor forest stand.  
 
The issue with stand-level analysis and exogenous timber price is that it does not take into account 
market-level implications when carbon subsidies change the optimal management regime. Numerical 
results of the market-level model shows that moderate carbon prices lengthen rotation periods and 
increase timber price for the transition period regardless of the policy being unilateral or applied to 
both land classes. After the transition, total timber supply remains higher and timber price settles at a 
lower level. With a sufficiently high carbon price, forest is left under conservation as in the stand-
level examples. Again, all the effects of carbon subsidies on the optimal solution are stronger in the 
poor forest. The average cost per additional CO2 unit stored is higher in the poor forest until the forest 
is allocated under conservation, as in the stand-level examples. 
 
By studying the change in the net present value of carbon net flow, we obtain examples of carbon 
leakage when the carbon policy is unilateral. The amount of occurred leakage in our examples is 
considerably lower than in the previous studies ( e.g. 42%-95% estimated positive leakage in Gan 
and McCarl 2007). Partly the large difference is due to independent alternative land use in our model. 
If alternative land use would compete in the same markets (e.g. same agricultural crop), it would 
certainly have an effect on the carbon leakage, as carbon policy may induce afforestation. However, 
in some cases it is well justified to assume that alternative land use is independent between land 
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classes. Our growth parameters are estimated from Southern Finland (fertile site) and the very North 
of Finland (poor site). These areas would have very different alternative land uses even though the 
timber production competes in the same market, as the growth conditions and growth time differ. 
 
Some previous studies (e.g. Murray et al. 2004,  Gan and McCarl 2007) on carbon leakage consider 
timber production as an indicator of leakage instead of the change in carbon net flow. This premise 
ignores the effects of afforestation on carbon leakage. Our results show that, as unilateral policy leads 
to forest conservation with a sufficiently high carbon price, increase in the timber production in other 
areas leads to afforestation and negative carbon leakage in commercially managed forests. However, 
it is notable that in the case of an open-access forest, increase in the timber supply would inarguably 
lead to positive carbon leakage, as no-one has the incentive to regenerate the forest (García et al. 
2018). It is also notable that as carbon sequestration program may increase long-term harvests, it may 
replace harvests that are more unsustainable and possibly illegal. Change in the timber price may also 
affect the market share of other materials, which is outside of boundaries of our analysis.  
 
Mathematical analysis by Murray et al. (2004) argue that small carbon sequestration projects have 
relatively higher carbon leakage due to the higher elasticity in the demand. Our results suggest that 
the amount of carbon leakage is similar regardless of the harvest volume of the forest under carbon 
policy. As Murray et al. (2004) consider sole timber production as indicator of leakage, it is also static 
and omits the time factor completely. It is possible that our model would give similar results if we 
would place a forest under carbon policy at time t and analyze the immediate changes in carbon net 
flow. However, given that time is an essential feature in climate change and forest economics, it is 
well justified to study long-term changes in carbon net flow.  
 
Time is an essential factor when considering the increase in timber output under carbon policy. Both 
stand-level and market-level examples show that, with moderate carbon prices, the forest under 
carbon policy increase its long-term timber supply. However, as carbon prices lengthen the optimal 
rotation, short-term timber output decreases due to carbon subsidies. An immediate reaction to a 
decrease in the timber output would be an increase in timber price, which would lead to increasing 
harvests outside the policy area. This explains why choosing timber output as indicator of leakage 
without considering the policy’s long-term effects on carbon sequestration may result in an increase 
in carbon emissions outside the policy area. However, given the long-term nature of the costs caused 
by excessive carbon dioxide in the atmosphere, we can argue that there is a fundamental difference 
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between evaluating short-term shifts in the markets and including both the short- and the long-term 
effects of the policies under investigation. 
 
It is noteworthy that the change in the optimal management regime due to carbon subsidies depends 
on the forest productivity. Our stand-level examples suggest that a forest of poor productivity is 
placed under conservation with considerably low carbon prices, which may induce afforestation 
outside the policy area. Afforestation outside the policy area would result in further decrease in carbon 
emissions, which would enhance the effects of the sequestration program. In the market-level second-
best policy analysis, our results suggest that the change in the management regime would be optimal 
at the same carbon price in both forests. This implies that the extent of the carbon sequestration 
program has an effect on the management regime change, as the results differ from the first-best 
policy scenario. The difference between stand-level and market-level results can be explained by the 
mutual stumpage price in the market-level model, as the forests face different prices in the stand-level 
example.  
 
The longer rotation periods due to carbon subsidies may also lead to changes in sawlog and pulpwood 
supply, which would have market effects of its own. The effects that carbon subsidies have on the 
demand side is a topic that should be investigated in the future research. As we study forests with 
different productivities, it should be noted that there are various services forests provide other than 
sole timber production. Forest with poor productivity may provide other ecosystem services so that 
the economic viability of sole timber production is nonexistent. Amenity values, value of biodiversity 
and forest’s value for tourism are factors that should be considered in the future market-level studies 
as well. 
 
 In our market-level model, poor and fertile forestland have a mutual stumpage price. Often the poor 
forestlands suffer from long distances and inaccessibility, resulting in higher costs and smaller 
stumpage price. This could be achieved by including a coefficient for logistics in the poor forestland 
harvests. Intuitively, this would increase the effects of carbon subsidy program and support our results 
further. In addition, adding regeneration cost into the model could lengthen the rotation periods and 
enhance the effect of negative leakage. Even though the economic models used in this thesis has 
assumptions and simplifications of its own, it does provide a sound argument that carbon 
sequestration programs in forestry does not necessarily lead to positive carbon leakage. 
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5 Conclusions 
The purpose of this thesis is to show the effects of carbon subsidies on forests of different 
productivities in stand-level analysis and in market-level analysis. The stand-level analysis is studied 
with the Faustmann model (1849) with carbon storage, as presented by Van Kooten et al. (1995). The 
market-level analysis expands the age-class structured model by Mitra and Wan (1985) with multiple 
land classes, as in Salo & Tahvonen (2002) and alternative land use and carbon storage, as presented 
by Tahvonen & Rautiainen (2017). The numerical examples of both analyses show that carbon 
subsidies may lengthen the optimal rotation period, increase the annual timber output and increase 
the amount of carbon units stored in the forest. A high enough carbon price leads to the entire forest 
or a part of the forest left unharvested. All the effects are stronger in the forest of poor productivity.  
 
The market-level results show that, with two land classes and alternative land use, the forestland-
specific harvests are cyclical and lead to an even total timber flow. Carbon subsidies lengthen the 
optimal rotation, induce afforestation and increase the timber output. An increase in the timber output 
leads to a decrease in the market price. A sufficiently high carbon price leads to forest conservation, 
as in the stand-level example. All the effects of carbon subsidies are stronger in the poor forest. 
 
Unilateral policies lead to increase in timber output inside the policy, which decreases the timber 
price and results in deforestation outside the policy area. As sufficiently high carbon price leads to 
forest conservation, timber price increases and results in afforestation and negative carbon leakage 
outside the policy area. Maximum amount of leakage is similar in both forests and the magnitude of 
leakage depends on the carbon price. The results are in contradiction with the common hypothesis 
that increasing carbon sequestration in forests by unilateral policy would inevitably lead to an increase 
in carbon emissions outside the policy area. 
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Appendices 
 
 Appendix 1. AMPL/Knitro code for market-level optimization problem. 
 
Parameters and variables 
 
 
param p:=0.3   #carbon price 
param beta:=1  #carbon decay rate 
param T:=400;  #max time 
param r:=0.03;  #interest rate 
param b := 1/(1+r) #Discount factor 
param n=24;    #max age class 
param alpha:=0.8;  #forest demand function parameter   
Param gamma:=0.4;  #agricultural land demand function parameter 
param W1:=4;  #Agricultural land utility function 
param W2=2;  #Agricultural land utility function 
param U=1;  #forest utility function 
param x10 {s in 1..n};  #forest 1 age class allocation 
param x20 {i in 1..n};  #forest 2 age class allocation 
param f1:=   #Fertile forest growth 
      1 0 
      2 0 
      3 0 
      4 7 
      5 30 
      6 76 
      7 139 
      8 206 
      9 269 
      10 321 
      11 362 
      12 393 
      13 415 
      14 431 
      15 442 
      16 449 
      17 455 
      18 458 
      19 461 
      20 462 
      21 463 
      22 464 
      23 465 
      24 465;   
 
param f2:=   #Poor forest growth 
1 0 
2 0 
3 0 
4 1 
5 3 
6 7 
7 13 
8 22 
9 34 
10 48 
11 64 
12 81 
13 99 
14 116 
15 134 
16 151 
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17 167 
18 182 
19 196 
20 208 
21 220 
22 239 
23 247 
24 254;   
 
 
var x1 {s in 1..n, t in 0..T+1}>=0;  #forest 1 age class 
var x2 {i in 1..n, t in 0..T+1}>=0;  #forest 2 age class 
var y1 {t in 0..T+1}>=0; #agriculture1 land allocation 
var y2 {t in 0..T+1}>=0;  #agriculture2 land allocation 
var Y {t in 0..T+1}=y1[t]+y2[t];  #total agland amount 
var z1 {t in 0..T-1}>=0;  #timber harvest 1 
var z2 {t in 0..T-1}>=0;  #timber harvest 2 
var h1 {t in 0..T-1}>=0;  #forest1 land allocation 
var h2 {t in 0..T-1}>=0;  #forest2 land allocation 
var c {t in 0..T-1}=(z1[t]+z2[t]); #total harvestable timber amount 
var woodprice {t in 0..T-2}=U*alpha*(c[t])^(alpha-1); #wood price 
var q1 { t in 0..T-1}=sum{s in 1..n} ((f1[s]*(x1[s,t+1]-x1[s,t])+(1-beta)*z1[t])); #carbon net flow in forest 1 
var q2 { t in 0..T-1}=sum{i in 1..n} ((f2[i]*(x2[i,t+1]-x2[i,t])+(1-beta)*z2[t])); #carbon net flow in forest 2 
var v1 {t in 0..T-1}>=0;  #volume of living trees in x1 
var v2 {t in 0..T-1}>=0;  #volume of living trees in x2 
var V {t in 0..T-1}=(v1[t]+v2[t]);  #total volume of living trees 
var NPV1 {t in 0..T-1}>=-100000; #forest sector net present utility 
var ANPV1 {t in 0..T-1}=b^((t+1)*5)*(U*(c[t])^alpha); 
var BLV1 {t in 0..T-1}>=-100000; 
var ABLV1 {t in 0..T-1}=b^((t+1)*5)*((U*alpha*(c[t])^(alpha-1))*z1[t]); #forest 1 net present utility 
var BLV2 {t in 0..T-1}>=-100000; 
var ABLV2 {t in 0..T-1}=b^((t+1)*5)*((U*alpha*(c[t])^(alpha-1))*z2[t]); #forest 2 net present utility 
var BLV1ha {t in 0..T-1}>=-100000; 
var ABLV1ha {t in 0..T-1}=b^((t+1)*5)*((U*alpha*(c[t])^(alpha-1))*z1[t]/(h1[t])); #forest 1 net present utility per ha 
var BLV2ha {t in 0..T-1}>=-100000; 
var ABLV2ha {t in 0..T-1}=b^((t+1)*5)*((U*alpha*(c[t])^(alpha-1))*z2[t]/(h2[t])); #forest 2 net present utility per ha 
var NPVhiili1 {t in 0..T-1}>=-100000; 
var ANPVhiili1 {t in 0..T-1}=b^((t+1)*5)*(p*q1[t]); #Carbon subsidy npv 
var AgNPV1 {t in 0..T-1}>=-100000; 
var AAgNPV1 {t in 0..T-1}=b^((t+1)*5)*((W1*alpha*(y1[t])^(alpha-1))*y1[t]); #agland 1 net present utility 
var AgNPV2 {t in 0..T-1}>=-100000; 
var AAgNPV2 {t in 0..T-1}=b^((t+1)*5)*((W2*alpha*(y2[t])^(alpha-1))*y2[t]); #agland 1 net present utility 
var NPVhiili2 {t in 0..T-1}>=-100000; 
var ANPVhiili2 {t in 0..T-1}=b^((t+1)*5)*(p*q2[t]); #Carbon subsidy npv 
var Qnpv1 {t in 0..T-1}>=-100000; 
var AQnpv1 {t in 0..T-1}=b^((t+1)*5)*(q1[t]);  #npv of carbon net flow 1 
var Qnpv2 {t in 0..T-1}>=-100000; 
var AQnpv2 {t in 0..T-1}=b^((t+1)*5)*(q2[t]);  #npv of carbon net flow 2 
 
 
Code 
 
 
#Objective function: 
 
maximize objective_function: sum{t in 0..T-2} 
b^((t+1)*5)*(U*(z1[t]+z2[t])^alpha+W1*(y1[t])^gamma+W2*(y2[t])^gamma+p*q1[t]+p*q2[t]); 
 
#constraints: 
 
subject to const1{s in 1..n-2, t in 0..T-1}: x1[s+1,t+1]-x1[s,t]<=0; 
 
subject to const2{i in 1..n-2, t in 0..T-1}: x2[i+1,t+1]-x2[i,t]<=0; 
 
subject to const3{t in 0..T-1}: x1[n,t+1]-x1[n,t]-x1[n-1,t]<=0; 
 
subject to const4{t in 0..T-1}: x2[n,t+1]-x2[n,t]-x2[n-1,t]<=0; 
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subject to const5{s in 1..n}: x1[s,0]=x10[s]; 
 
subject to const6{i in 1..n}: x2[i,0]=x20[i]; 
 
subject to const7{t in 0..T-1}: y1[t]=1-sum{s in 1..n} x1[s,t]; 
 
subject to const8{t in 0..T-1}: y2[t]=1-sum{i in 1..n} x2[i,t]; 
 
subject to const10{t in 0..T-1}: z1[t]=sum{s in 1..n-2} (f1[s]*(x1[s,t]-x1[s+1,t+1]))+f1[n]*(x1[n,t]+x1[n-1,t]-x1[n,t+1]); 
 
subject to const11{t in 0..T-1}: z2[t]=sum{i in 1..n-2} (f2[i]*(x2[i,t]-x2[i+1,t+1]))+f2[n]*(x2[n,t]+x2[n-1,t]-x2[n,t+1]); 
 
subject to const15{t in 0..T-1}: h1[t]=sum{s in 1..n} x1[s,t]; 
 
subject to const16{t in 0..T-1}: h2[t]=sum{i in 1..n} x2[i,t]; 
 
subject to const17{t in 0..T-1}: v1[t]=sum{s in 1..n} f1[s]*x1[s,t]; 
 
subject to const18{t in 0..T-1}: v2[t]=sum{i in 1..n} f2[i]*x2[i,t]; 
 
 
 
